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The Supreme Court is currently in retreat from libertarian con-
structions of the rights of individuals and minorities. Ironically, 
this retreat coincides with the bicentenary of the bill of Rights, 
drafted and debated in 1789 and ratified in 1791. No less ironic, 
political opposition to the Court's previously broad construction of 
those guarantees has been inspired by what is called the "Madis-
onian dilemma."I Simply put, the dilemma is one of allowing ma-
jorities to govern while also safeguarding the rights of minorities. 
The Court's critics argued that majoritarianism was central to the 
"Madisonian system," and therefore judicial review ought to be 
sharply limited in deference to legislative majorities. The Warren 
and the Burger Courts' rulings striking down state laws in defense 
of individual rights were thus attacked for being counter-
majoritarian.2 Opposition to their rulings is now internalized 
within the Court itself, due to changes in its composition and the 
emergence of a solid conservative bloc on the Rehnquist Court.3 
The problem of the Court's institutional role is not new. But, 
the "Madisonian dilemma" gave it a new twist and "set the terms 
* Professor, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs. 
Copyrighted 1990, David M. O'Brien. This article was originally prepared for delivery at the 
"James Madison Symposium" in Madisonville, Kentucky, September 27, 1990, and appears 
in a slightly different version in The Review of Politics ( 1991 ). The author is grateful for the 
support of the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Kentucky Humanities Council, 
and his former colleague, Robert J. Morgan, as well as for the assistance of Steve Bragaw. 
While absolving them of responsibility for any of the interpretative arguments here, the au-
thor benefited from the reading of and comments on an early draft by Professors Lance Ban-
ning, Kermit Hall, and Leonard Levy. 
I. R. BoRK, THE TEMPTING Of AMERICA 239 (1990). 
2. For further discussion, see O'Brien, The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger to 
Rehnquist, PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICS 12 (1987). 
3. See, O'Brien, The Rehnquist Court Comes of Age, UPDATE ON LAW-RELATED ED-
UCATION 3 (Fall 1989); and Chemerinsky, Forword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 44 (1989). 
119 
120 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:119 
for the contemporary debate over judicial review."4 "The root diffi-
culty," argued Alexander Bickel, "is that judicial review is a 
counter-majoritarian force in our system ... [because] it thwarts the 
will of representatives of the actual people of here and now, and 
therefore is a 'deviant institution in the American democracy.' "s 
Judicial review "must achieve some measure of consonance," Bickel 
contended, with "the idea, central to the process of gaining the con-
sent of the governed, that the majority has the ultimate power to 
displace the decision-makers and to reject any part of their policy. "6 
Robert Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia, among others, champion 
this interpretation of constitutional politics as well.7 Justice Scalia, 
for instance, defends a "jurisprudence of original intentions" on the 
following ground: 
The principal theoretical defect of nonoriginalism, in my view, is its incompati-
bility with the very principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality. 
Nothing in the text of the Constitution confers upon the courts the power to inquire 
into, rather than passively assume, the constitutionality of federal statutes. . . . 
Quite to the contrary, the legislature would seem a much more appropriate exposi· 
tor of social values, and its determination that a statute is compatible with the Con-
stitution should, as in England, prevaiJ.8 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith 9 is illustrative of how Justice Scalia's understanding of the 
Court's limited role undergirds his interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. The discussion is also, I argue later, sharply at odds with 
James Madison's vision of constitutional politics. Smith involved 
two Native-American Indians denied unemployment compensation. 
They had been discharged for taking peyote for sacramental pur-
poses during religious ceremonies of the Native American Church. 
Citing Sherbert v. Verner 10 the Oregon Supreme Court interpreted 
the free exercise clause to require the state to demonstrate a compel-
ling interest. In a sweeping opinion for the Court, however, Justice 
Scalia rejected Sherbert's balancing test. In spite of Sherbert and 
other prior rulings, Justice Scalia held that the first amendment 
guarantee for religious freedom does not require exemptions from 
generally applicable laws. Moreover, he observed that, "[v]alues 
that are protected against government interference through en-
4. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 71. 
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shrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the 
political process." 11 Except when the government is literally for-
bidden by the Constitution from legislating on specific matters, in 
Justice Scalia's view, the meaning of the guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights should be determined not by the Court but by the forces of 
majoritarian democracy in state legislatures.12 In Justice Scalia's 
words:l3 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place 
at relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but 
that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a 
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the 
social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 
Although not drawing the same conclusions as Justice Scalia, 
even defenders of libertarian rulings of the Warren Courts, includ-
ing Jesse Choper,l4 John Ely,1s and Michael Perry,l6 have taken the 
"Madisonian dilemma" for granted in their ill-fated attempts to rec-
oncile judicial review and majoritarian democracy. 11 Not everyone, 
to be sure, has been deceived by that formation of the Court's prob-
lem. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., for one, countered that, 
"Faith in democracy is one thing, blind faith quite another. Those 
who drafted our Constitution understood the difference. One can-
not read the text without admitting that it embodies substantive 
choices; it places certain values beyond the power of any legisla-
ture."ls No less eloquently, Justice Robert Jackson observed that, 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities 
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. 
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of 
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; 
they depend on the outcome of no elections. 19 
Still, the "Madisonian dilemma" has dominated contemporary de-
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bate and suggested a "majoritarian paradigm"2o for the Rehnquist 
Court's construction of constitutional law. 
The "Madisonian dilemma" has been misleading in many 
ways, not only in debates over the Court but also in writing about 
the Framers' Muse, James Madison. Whether or not the "republi-
can revival"2J in constitutional scholarship contributes to reorient-
ing debate over the Court, Madison's theory of republicanism 
merits re-examination. My aim here, however, goes beyond simply 
showing that the "Madisonian dilemma" as constructed by Bickel 
and Bork is unfaithful to Madison's political vision. As a genuinely 
original political thinker and one of the chief architects of the Con-
stitution, Madison developed a unique theory of republicanism and 
a novel theory of constitutional interpretation. Contrary to Bickel 
and Bork, republican liberty, not majoritarianism, lies at the heart 
of the Madisonian system. Indeed, Madison was convinced that re-
publican liberty was primarily threatened by popular majorities and 
legislative majorities in both Congress and the states. For that rea-
son, he redefined republicanism, endeavoring to combine the insti-
tutions of representative government with auxiliary precautions for 
the rights of individuals and minorities. Far from rendering the 
Court a "deviant institution," Madison laid a basis for the Court's 
role in defending republican liberty. Madison anticipated and re-
jected a "jurisprudence of original intentions," and articulated in-
stead a theory of pragmatic constitutional interpretivism. 
I. MADISON'S REPUBLIC 
"Who are the Best keepers of the People's Liberties?"22 No 
less than today, that question was widely debated during the 
Founding. Madison posed it in a dialogue between a Republican 
and an Anti-republican, published anonymously a year after the rat-
ification of the Bill of Rights. The short answer for the Republican 
was:23 
The people themselves. The sacred trust can be no where so safe as in the 
hands most interested in preserving it. 
20. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 61. 
21. See id. at 74-95; M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRmCAL ANALYSIS 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71 (1988); Fallon, What Is Republicanism, And Is it Worth Reviv-
ing, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); Horowitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American 
Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57 (1987); Michelman, Foreword: Traces 
of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. (1986); Michelman, Law's Republic, 91 YALE L.J. 
1493 (1988); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); and Sun-
stein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). 
22. Madison, Who are the Best Keepers of the People's Liberties, National Gazette, Dec. 
20, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 426 (1983). 
23. Id. 
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By contrast, the Anti-republican responded: 
The people are stupid, suspicious, licentious. They cannot safely trust them-
selves. When they have established government they should think of nothing but 
obedience, leaving the care of their liberties to their wise rulers. 
At that, the Republican countered: 
Although all men are born free ... yet too true it is, that slavery has been the 
general lot of the human race. Ignorant-they have been cheated; asleqr-they 
have been surprised: divided-the yoke has been forced upon them. but what is the 
lesson? 
123 
The lesson Madison drew was that republicanism presumed a 
"people [who were] enlightened ... awakened ... [and] united" in 
watching over the watchmen. Republican liberty ultimately de-
pended on a people who cared about res publica, the public thing. 
Yet, according to Madison, the people themselves posed the great-
est threat to republicanism. And that created a real dilemma for 
Madison, because he championed republican liberty, popular self-
government, first and foremost. "What a perversion of the natural 
order of things," as he observed through the words of the Republi-
can, "to make power the primary and central object of the social 
system, and Liberty but its satellite. "24 Madison's republicanism 
took a distinctively American form, based on a faith in reason and a 
libertarian dedication to safeguarding the rights of individuals and 
minorities from the oppressive forces of majoritarianism. 
"Republicanism" was the watchword of the Founding pe-
riod.2s It stood for popular sovereignty, in Montesquieu's words, 
for a government in which "the body or only a part of the people is 
possessed of supreme power. "26 Still, there was wide disagreement 
over what it entailed. Like "federalism," "state sovereignty" and 
much else, the meaning of "republicanism" was if anything less 
clear and more divisive than today.21 During the Founding, polit-
ical discourse was ambiguous and in flux. Madison's contribution 
to the conceptual change in the understanding of "republicanism" 
was unique. His republicanism presumed that nature-that is, indi-
viduals' self-interests and the conditions of American life-could be 
improved by political architecture. 
24. /d. 
25. See, Hanson, 'Commons' and 'Commonwealth' at the American Founding, Demo-
erotic Republicanism as the New American Hybrid, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CON-
STITUTION 165 (T. Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds. 1988). 
26. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Bk. I, at 107 (0. Carrithers ed. 1977). 
27. See, F. MCDoNALD, NOVUS 0RDO SECLORUM 4-5 (1985); G. WOOD, THE CREA-
TION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 485, 513, 562 (1972); and O'Brien, Federal-
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Before the Constitutional Convention convened in May of 
1787, Madison undertook a study of confederations and the 
problems besieging the Continental Congress in order to form "in 
his own mind some outlines of a new system. "2s One result was a 
series of notes on Ancient & Modern Confederacies, prepared in the 
spring of 1786.29 Another, prepared the following spring, was a 
memorandum on the Vices of the Political System of the United 
States. 30 The latter contains one of his clearest statements of the 
problems of securing republican liberty. Surprisingly, it neither be-
gins nor ends with a catalogue of the structural and practical 
problems of the Articles of Confederation. Instead, Madison fo-
cuses on state encroachments on federal authority and denial of the 
rights of individuals and minorities. The "multiplicity," "mutabil-
ity," and "injustice" of state laws were "more alarming," because 
they brought "into question the fundamental principle of republican 
Government, that the majority who rule in such Governments, are 
the safest Guardians both of public Good and of private rights."3I 
According to Madison, the denial of individual rights by legislative 
majorities was at the root of the crisis in republicanism in the 1780s. 
In Vices, and throughout his career, Madison was preoccupied 
with safeguarding "the rights and interests of the minority, or of 
individuals" against oppression by popular majorities, whether op-
erating through the legislative process in Congress or the states. 32 
Unrestricted rule by popular majorities struck "at the very heart of 
republicanism"33 by denying the possibility of governance by a 
"constitutional majority. "34 
Republican liberty, including the rights and interests of indi-
viduals and minorities, was endangered by the influence that popu-
lar majorities had, "1. in the Representative bodies, 2. in the people 
themselves."3s In Vices and elsewhere, he complained that repre-
sentatives in Congress and state legislatures failed to pay "fidelity to 
28. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (April 16, 1787), reprinted in 9 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 382-83 (1975). 
29. Madison, Ancient & Modem Confederacies, reprinted in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 3 (1975). 
30. Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, reprinted in 9 THE PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON 348 (1975). 
31. ld. at 354. 
32. ld. at 355. 
33. Letter from James Madison (1833), reprinted in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON 326 (1884). 
34. See, id. at 333 and the discussion in the text at infra note 60, as well as R. MoRGAN, 
JAMES MADISON ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 197-99 (1988). 
35. Madison, supra note 30, at 354. 
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the collective interests of the whole."36 That in tum, he worried, 
would erode public confidence in and the stability of republican 
government. Madison lamented that elected representatives could 
not be completely trusted, that they often acted as "advocates for 
the respective interests of their constituents"37 and as "dupe[s] of a 
favorite leader." As a result, legislative majorities were prone to 
enact "base and selfish measures, masked by pretexts of public good 
and apparent expediency."3s Popular majorities outside of legisla-
tive halls were "still more fatal."39 
Even without acceptable alternatives, republicanism was prob-
lematic for Madison. He agreed that, "[i]n republican Government 
the majority ... ultimately g[a]ve the law." But, more importantly, 
he pondered, "what is to restrain [the majority] from unjust viola-
tions of the rights and interests of the minority, or of individuals?"40 
Madison's solution to the problem of republicanism was 
neither simple nor entirely shared by his contemporaries. It sprang 
in part from deconstructing the traditional understanding of repub-
licanism. First, Madison doubted that elected representatives and 
popular majorities could be reliably restrained by considerations of 
either the civic "good of the Community" or personal character and 
reputation; appeals to religion were even more problematic.41 Sec-
ond, he rejected Montesquieu's teaching that republican forms of 
government were possible only in small territories. In his Vices, 
during the convention, and later in the Federalist, he advanced his 
well-known argument for republicanism based on a large extended 
republic. 42 
When introducing in Vices the idea that "the enlargement of 
the sphere is found to lessen the insecurity of private rights,"43 
Madison aims to show how oppression by popular majorities might 
be minimized. In an extended and populous territory, "common 
interests or passion is less apt to be felt and the requisite combina-
36. Madison, Notes on Debates (Jan. 28, 1783), reprinted in 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 141, 147 (1969). 
37. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 3, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 373-74 (1973). 
38. Madison, supra note 30, at 354. 
39. !d. at 355. 
40. /d. at 355-56. 
41. !d. at 356. See also the discussion in the text at infra note 139. 
42. See, THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 14, and 63, at 77, 99, and 382 (J. Madison) (C. 
Rossiter ed. 1961). 
43. Madison, supra note 30, at 357. This is Madison's "naturalist" argument for repub-
licanism. It rests on the recognition that (I) perceived self-interests of individuals incline 
them to band together in common interests and passions, and (2) a vast and plentiful land 
makes their doing so difficult. Time, territory and other difficulties of concerted action over 
great distances within each state constitute barriers that must be overcome. 
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tions less easy to be formed by a great than by a small number. "44 
The heterogeneity of growing populations brings "a greater variety 
of interests, of pursuits, of passions, which check each other."4s 
These sociological and geographical factors weigh as well in the 
political process. If properly designed, governmental institutions 
would encourage the "refinement of [public] opinion" and make 
possible governance by a moderate "constitutional majority."46 
Madisonian republicanism thus placed a premium on the inevitabil-
ity and desirability of a kind of liberal toleration that accompanies 
the cultural pluralism of large populous territories. 
From Madison's perspective, Montesquieu's teaching that re-
publicanism was feasible only in small territories was not just 
wrong; it was wholly inapplicable to the American experience. By 
Montesquieu's standards, Madison's beloved state of Virginia (with 
its estimated 125,525 square miles47) was too large to sustain repub-
licanism. But, on Madison's reconstructed republicanism, the op-
posite appeared closer to the truth. Even the individual states could 
enjoy the benefits of being expanded republics. Indeed, Virginia 
needed to grow in population in order to guard against oppression, 
especially in the name of religion, by state legislative majorities.4s 
Madison wondered whether "the inconveniences of popular States 
contrary to the prevailing Theory [that is, Montesquieu's theory], 
are in proportion not to the extent, but to the narrowness of their 
[territorial] limits."49 For these reasons, he consistently encouraged 
immigration into the United States, the country's territorial expan-
sion, and the creation of new states. 
For strategic reasons, Madison did not touch upon the idea 
that the states might themselves be "extended republics" in the Fed-
eralist. When differentiating republicanism from "a pure democ-
racy"so in Federalist Number 10, Madison does so in language 
reminiscent of that in Vices and equally applicable to curbing popu-
lar majorities within each state as well as the nation. "The two 
great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are," 
in his words, "first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, 
to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the 
greater number of citizens and greater sphere of country over which 
44. /d. 
45. /d. 
46. Madison, supra note 33, at 333. 
47. See, I THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 96 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987). 
48. See, e.g., Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 
(June 20, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295 ( 1973). 
49. Madison, supra note 30, at 357. 
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 42, at 81. 
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the latter may be extended."s1 Both were crucial and interdepen-
dent. The first, one of political design, bears on the Constitution's 
creation of a representative form of government and system of insti-
tutional checks and balances. The second, Madison's "naturalist" 
argument, is the one stressed in Federalist Number 10. Referring to 
the utility of an economy of scale in terms of population and terri-
tory, Madison observes:s2 
Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you 
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to 
invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be 
more difficulty for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison 
with each other. 
This "advantage which a republic has over a democracy," he notes, 
"is enjoyed by a large over a small republic-is enjoyed by the 
Union over the States composing it."s3 Although not pressing the 
point here, Madison recognized that this advantage was also one 
that republican governments in large states had over those in small 
states. Instead, Madison concludes Federalist Number 10 with the 
hope that though "factious leaders may kindle a flame within their 
particular States ... [they] will be unable to spread a general confla-
gration throughout the other States. "s4 
One of Madison's distinctive contributions to republicanism 
was his "naturalist" argument. No less critical, though, was his 
thought about the architectural design of governmental institutions. 
Representative government required additional institutional checks 
and balances or, as he referred to them elsewhere in the Federalist, 
"auxiliary precautions."ss In a well-known passage in Federalist 
Number 51, Madison highlights their importance when asking 
"what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on 
human nature?"s6 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern 
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In 
framing government, which is to be administered by men, the great difficulty lies in 
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next 
place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the pri-
mary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity 
of auxiliary precautions. 
Again, in Federalist Number 63, he emphasizes that the "advantage 
51. /d. at 82. 
52. /d. at 83. 
53. /d. 
54. /d. at 84. 
55. See, THE FEDERALIST Nos. 51 and 63 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 317 and 382. 
56. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 322. 
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[of a large and populous republic] ought not to be considered as 
superseding the use of auxiliary precautions. "57 
How far Madison distanced the institutions of republican gov-
ernment from majoritarianism is underscored in Federalist Number 
39. There, he again distinguishes the Constitution's creation from 
democratic and other kinds of regimes. In a republican form of 
government, "[i]t is essential to such a government that it be derived 
from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable pro-
portion or a favored class of it."5s This feature of republicanism 
distinguishes the Constitution from "mixed regimes," such as that 
in England, and from aristocratic and monarchic regimes. It was 
even further removed from majoritarian democracy by Madison's 
observation that 
It is sufficient for such a government that the persons administering it be ap-
pointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their ap-
pointments by either of the tenures just specified [that is, popularly elected 
representatives, who hold "their offices during pleasure for a limited behavior"]. 59 
Distinguishing between republicanism and majoritarian democracy 
in this way points towards Madison's resolution of the problem 
with republicanism. The Constitution created a system of represen-
tative government in which the "political and constitutional major-
ity [governs] in contradistinction to a numerical majority of the 
people."60 In the Madisonian system, the governing constitutional 
majority is necessarily a numerical minority when compared with 
the more numerous and popular majority within the states. Still, in 
large and populous territories, government by a constitutional ma-
jority, subject to the auxiliary precautions of institutional checks 
and balances, was the only way Madison deemed republican liberty 
might be secured against majoritarianism in the states and the 
nation. 
While defending the Constitution in the Federalist, Madison 
concealed deep disappointment with the document. The Constitu-
tional Convention failed to embrace all of the auxiliary precautions 
demanded by his vision of republicanism. The "excesses of democ-
racy"6t were insufficiently curbed to ensure the "genius of republi-
can liberty."62 Although the Convention agreed to the supremacy 
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 385. 
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 241. 
59. /d. 
60. Madison, supra note 33, at 333. 
61. E. Gerry in I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 48 (M. Farrand 
ed. 1914); and THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 244. 
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 224, and 227. 
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of the Constitution and congressional legislation over state laws, 63 it 
rejected one "great desideratum:"64 a national sanction, or veto, 
over state laws. 
Shortly before the convention, Madison wrote George Wash-
ington that "a negative in all cases what-so-ever on the legislative 
acts of the States, as heretofore exercised by the Kingly prerogative, 
appears to me to be absolutely necessary." "The great desidera-
tum," he explained, was "some disinterested & dispassionate um-
pire in disputes between different passions & interests in the State." 
Without that, the national government's powers could be "evaded 
& defeated" by the states. "Another happy effect of this preroga-
tive," he added, "would be its control on the internal vicissitudes of 
State policy; and the aggressions of interested majorities on the 
rights of minorities and individuals. "6s 
Though failing to indicate to Washington how a national veto 
would be exercised, Madison immediately turned to the necessity of 
establishing the "national supremacy" of the judiciary and execu-
tive branch. Later, he stood behind, and probably wrote,66 the so-
called "Virginia Plan."67 Submitted for consideration at the Consti-
tutional Convention by Edmund Randolph, that plan would have 
empowered Congress to veto state legislation and to enact legisla-
tion overriding state laws deemed defective or disruptive of national 
harmony. Moveover, it called for the creation of a council of revi-
sion (composed of members of the judiciary and the executive 
branch) which would have the power to veto congressionallegisla-
tion.6s Both proposals registered Madison's distrust of legislative 
majorities. When defending a council of revision on three separate 
occasions at the convention, he returned to the analysis originally 
contained in Vices:69 
It would be useful to the Judiciary departm[en]t by giving it an additional opportu-
nity of defending itself ag[ain]st: Legislature encroachments .... It would more-
over be useful to the Community at large as an additional check ag[ain]st a pursuit 
of those unwise & unjust measures which constituted so great a portion of our ca-
lamities [under the Articles of Confederation]. ... Experience in all the States had 
evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex. 
This was the real source of danger to the American Constitutions; & suggested the 
63. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
64. Madison, supra note 28, at 384. 
65. /d. at 383-84. 
66. See, I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 23-54 (1950). 
67. See, Farrand, supra note 61, at 28. 
68. The idea of a council of revision was not new. The New York state constitution 
provided for such a council and there was pressure in other states to adopt such provisions 
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necessity of giving every defensive authority to the other departments that was con-
sistent with republican principles. 
Unfortunately, from Madison's perspective, the Constitutional Con-
vention rejected both proposals for checking legislative majorities in 
Congress and the states. 
Less than two weeks before the Constitutional Convention ad-
journed, Madison complained to Thomas Jefferson that the Consti-
tution would "neither effectively answer its national object nor 
prevent the local mischiefs which everywhere excite disgusts against 
the state governments. 10 In another letter to Jefferson the following 
year, he renewed the complaint that "parchment barriers" inade-
quately dealt with the underlying threat to republican liberty. That 
threat arises from the people, "not from acts of the Government 
contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the 
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the 
constituents . . . This is a truth of great importance," which, 
Madison lamented, was "not yet sufficiently attended to."7t 
Madison's republicanism is richer and more complex than 
Bickel and Bork contend. Popular majorities, legislative majorities, 
and majoritarian democracy were far more troubling for Madison 
than they concede. At the heart of the Madisonian system was re-
publican liberty, not majoritarianism. Madison reconstructed re-
publican theory in light of the American experience and demand for 
popular and representative government. He did so in ways that re-
tained republicanism's association with ultimate popular sover-
eignty, while disassociating it from majoritarianism in the normal 
operation of government. His "naturalist" argument for how large 
and populous territories might augment the benefits of representa-
tive government made republicanism more agreeable. Still unsatis-
fied, Madison sought auxiliary institutional precautions against the 
oppressive majoritarianism in Congress and in the states. At virtu-
ally every turn, he limited majoritarianism in defense of republican 
liberty. That is why Madison despaired at the Constitutional Con-
vention's refusal to grant a national veto over state laws and to pro-
vide an additional check on legislative majorities within Congress. 
"It seems to be forgotten," Madison reflected in his twilight years, 
"that the abuses committed within the individual States ... by in-
terested or misguided majorities were among the prominent causes 
of the [the Constitution's] adoptions, and particularly led to the 
70. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1787), reprinted in 10 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 163 (1977). 
71. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in 11 
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provlSlon . which gives an appellate supremacy to the judicial 
department of the United States."n 
II. MADISON AND "PARCHMENT BARRIERS" 
Though drafting and introducing in the First Congress the 
amendments that eventually became the Bill of Rights, Madison 
was at best a reluctant supporter of what he considered "the nause-
ous project of amendments. "73 He resisted the project for several 
reasons. First, the Constitutional Convention's objective was 
strengthening, not weakening, the national government. And at the 
convention he had unsuccessfully pressed for additional institu-
tional safeguards for republican liberty. Second, he tended to agree 
with James Wilson74 and Alexander Hamilton7s that since the na-
tional government was limited to exercising expressly delegated 
powers, it had no power to legislate on such matters as religion and 
the press. In addition, as late as 1788 he opposed Anti-federalists' 
demands because he worried that amendments would only compli-
cate the ratification battle. Finally, he doubted that "declarations 
on paper" would be "an effective restraint."76 "[I]n a Government 
of opinion like ours," the most effective safeguard was the "sound-
ness and stability of the general opinion on the subject. "77 Madison 
shared the view expressed by John Mercer toward the end of the 
convention that, "[i]t is a great mistake to suppose that the paper 
we are to propose will govern the United States. It is the men 
whom it will bring into the government and interest in maintaining 
it that is to govern time. The paper will only mark out the mode 
and form. Men are the substance and must do the business."7s 
Madison's initial position, however, did not disparage republi-
can liberty or a declaration of rights in favor of legislative majori-
ties. Quite the contrary. At the Constitutional Convention, as 
noted, he pressed for a national veto over state laws and a council of 
revision in order to guard against the denial of individual rights by 
72. Madison, supra note 33, at 328. 
73. Letter from James Madison to Richard Peters (Aug. 19, 1789), reprinted in 12 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 346 (1979). 
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Elliot's Debates]. 
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77. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), reprinted in 3 
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the states and Congress. In 1785, when offering advice on a consti-
tution for Kentucky, he likewise endorsed the creation of a council 
of revision and the incorporation of provisions expressly restraining 
the state legislature from "meddling with religion- from abolishing 
Juries, from taking away the Habeas corpus-from forcing a citizen 
to give evidence against himself, from controuling the press. "79 
"Experience and refiection"8o led Madison to reconstruct re-
publicanism. So too, he was later led to embrace parchment guar-
antees for republican liberty. In December 1787, Jefferson wrote 
him complaining about "the omission of a bill of rights."81 That 
was the first of several letters contributing to his change in thinking. 
But, Madison's own political fate in 1788 was important as well. 
The Anti-federalists' opposition to the Constitution over the omis-
sion of a declaration of rights became increasingly worrisome. By 
June of 1788, the Anti-federalists were campaigning for a second 
constitutional convention. That prospect disturbed Madison, as did 
two votes that June in Virginia's state ratifying convention. The 
Anti-federalists' call for conditional amendments was defeated by a 
vote of 88 to 80, and the Constitution ratified by an 89-to-79 vote. 
Yet, the closeness of those votes moved Madison to publicly en-
dorse a declaration of rights. Then, the Virginia legislature refused 
to elect him to a seat in the United States Senate. He was outma-
neuvered by Patrick Henry's attack on the sincerity of his promise 
to push for amendments in Congress.82 With his subsequent elec-
tion to the House of Representatives, Madison was fully converted 
to the adoption of amendments. Still fearing the possibility of a 
second constitutional convention, he vowed to introduce amend-
ments because that was "the most expeditious mode ... [and] the 
safest mode. "83 
In July 1788, Jefferson again wrote Madison about the urgency 
of adopting a declaration of rights, but the letter failed to arrive 
until October 15.84 Two days later he responded with an extraordi-
nary one of his own, explaining he had "always been in favor of a 
bill of rights" and yet "never thought the omission a material de-
79. Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 35 (1973). 
80. Madison, supra note 33, at 327. 
81. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in 12 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 438, 440 (1955). 
82. See, generally, R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, 194-
98 (1969). 
83. Letter from James Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), reprinted in 11 THE PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON 404-05 (1977). 
84. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), reprinted in 13 
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fect."s' Madison gave four reasons for his ambivalence. First, he 
accepted the Federalists' argument that "the rights in question are 
reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted." 
Second, he feared "that a positive declaration of some of the most 
essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude." In 
particular, "the rights of Conscience" might be narrowed by any 
formal-legal definition. Third, republican liberty was guarded 
against Congress by its constitutionally "limited power" and "the 
jealousy" of the states. Finally, he maintained that "experience 
proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its 
control is most needed. "s6 
Madison did not view a declaration of rights in a more "impor-
tant light" primarily because of his theory of republicanism. In a 
monarchy, such guarantees might have "great effect, as a standard 
for trying the validity of public acts, and a signal for rousing & 
uniting the superior force of the community."s7 But, republicanism 
rested on popular sovereignty; in the end political power resided 
with the majority of the people. What use then, he rhetorically 
asked, would a declaration of rights have in a republic? 
His answer was two-fold and indicated a further refinement of 
his theory of republicanism. Republican liberty, he reiterated, "is 
chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to 
the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government 
is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents."ss 
A declaration of rights might educate and unite the people in sup-
port of republican liberty. "The political truths declared in that sol-
emn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental 
maxims of free Government, and as they become incorporated with 
the national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and pas-
sion."89 Moreover, Madison now conceded that, in the event of an 
abusive government, a declaration of rights might serve "as a good 
ground for an appeal to the sense of the community."90 
Basically, Madison came to favor a declaration of rights be-
cause of the wide-spread demand for it and because of its potential 
"to impress some degree of respect for [its guarantees and] to estab-
lish public opinion in their favor."9I He had yet to connect a decla-
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ration of rights and the kinds of institutional checks and balances he 
pushed for during the Constitutional Convention. On receiving his 
letter, however, Jefferson immediately responded by pointing out 
the omitted argument, "which has great weight with me, the legal 
check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary."92 Persuaded, 
Madison finally made a connection between a declaration of rights 
and the role of the Court. Three months later he relied on that 
argument in the House of Representatives when introducing his 
proposed amendments:93 
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will 
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be 
an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or 
executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights ex-
pressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights. 
Still, in spite of that grand oration and instead of expanding on the 
Court's role, Madison concentrated on turning the four principal 
arguments against such additions into good republican arguments 
for their adoption. 
Madison's main arguments in the House of Representatives, 
again, registered his commitment to republican liberty and distrust 
of majoritarianism. It had been argued that a declaration of rights 
was unnecessary because no such declaration existed in England. 
Never an Anglophile, Madison objected to the comparison (one 
that Justice Scalia now finds so attractive).94 England was not 
"wholly republican." Parliament's legislative power was "indefi-
nite," and thus a constant threat to republican liberty. The Magna 
Carta, moreover, stood as a barrier only against the Crown and con-
tained no guarantee for "[t]he freedom of the press and rights of 
conscience, those choicest privileges of the people. "9s Conceding 
that parchment barriers were weak, Madison observed that "they 
may have, to a certain degree, a salutary effect against the abuse of 
power"96 by inspiring public opinion and the support of the 
judiciary. 
Madison also now found inconclusive the Federalist argument 
that a declaration was unnecessary because the national government 
was limited to only enumerated powers. He countered that Con-
gress had vast uncertain powers under the Necessary and Proper 
92. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (March 15, 1789), repn·nted in 14 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 659 (1958). 
93. Madison, Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 91, at 206-07. 
94. See Scalia, supra note 8. 
95. Madison, Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 91, at 203. 
96. !d. at 206. 
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Clause,97 and recalled the abuses of legislative majonttes in the 
states. As in Vices, he argued that legislative power tends to expand 
to an "indefinite extent."9s Legislative majorities, whether in Con-
gress or the states, were often moved to deny the rights of individu-
als and minorities. "If there was reason for restraining state 
governments," reasoned Madison, "there is like reason for re-
straining the federal government."99 No more persuasive was the 
contention that a declaration of rights was unnecessary because 
state constitutions contained such provisions. Besides the fact that 
some states had no such guarantees, others contained "defective" 
and "absolutely improper" provisions. 
Finally, Madison took up the argument advanced by Alexan-
der Hamilton in Federalist No. 84. A declaration of rights, claimed 
Hamilton, was "not only unnecessary ... but would even be dan-
gerous" in defining exceptions to powers not granted and leaving 
"the utmost latitude of evasion." too Admitting that was "one of the 
most plausible arguments" against amendments, Madison re-
sponded by directing attention to his proposal which later became 
embodied in the ninth amendment.tot It provided that, "[t]he ex-
ceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of par-
ticular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just 
importance of other rights retained by the people."to2 
Madison's defense of what became the ninth amendment re-
flected Jefferson's influence. Madison had once feared "that a posi-
tive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be 
obtained in the requisite latitude."to3 But, Jefferson reassured him 
that, "[h]alf of a loaf is better than no bread. If we cannot secure all 
our rights, let's secure what we can." Jefferson moved Madison to 
view a declaration of rights as another auxiliary measure, which put 
into "the hands of the judiciary" an additional check on the coer-
cive power of legislative majorities. "This is a body," Jefferson had 
observed, "which is rendered independent, and kept strictly to their 
own department merits great confidence for their learning and 
integrity."t04 
Though converted to defending a declaration of rights, 
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Madison by no means held it in the same light as Jefferson. Like 
the Anti-federalists, Jefferson was primarily concerned with 
"guard[ing] the people against the federal government, as they are 
already guarded against their state governments in most in-
stances."tos For Madison the principal threat to republican liberty 
came not from the national government, but from the influence of 
popular and legislative majorities in Congress and the states. He 
never abandoned his preoccupation with the darker side of 
majoritarian rule. As a consequence, whatever "legal check" the 
amendments might give the judiciary, in the 1780s Madison consid-
ered them little more than another precautionary measure.t06 
Madison's republicanism guided and structured the amend-
ments introduced in the House. Notably, his first proposal rein-
forced the bedrock of republicanism as a prefix to the 
Constitution: 101 
That all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from the people. 
That government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the 
people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquir-
ing and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and 
safety. 
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to re-
form or change their government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the 
purpose of its institution. 
The people are sovereign and ultimately "the best keepers"tos of 
republican liberty. Rather than embracing majoritarianism in the 
normal operation of government, Madison thereby aimed to reaf-
firm that, in the event of an oppressive government, the people 
might undertake constitutional reforms, either through the amend-
ment processt09 or subversion of the government. Yet, so long as 
the Constitution remained in place, the "constitutional majority" it 
created governed. Republican liberty, Madison remained con-
vinced, was more likely to be secured through representative gov-
ernment, as constrained by auxiliary precautions and as augmented 
by the benefits of large and populous territories. Still, if this experi-
ment in constitutional government failed, he never doubted the ulti-
mate power of the people to revise or abandon the Constitution. 
How deeply Madison's libertarianism was woven into his the-
ory of republicanism stands out not only in the amendments that 
eventually comprised the Bill of Rights. Even more noteworthy 
105. Jefferson, supra note 84, at 443. 
106. See, Madison, supra note 71, at 299. 
107. Madison, Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 91, at 200. 
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were his ill-fated proposals to bar Congress and the states from de-
nying the "full and equal rights of conscience."Iw Because in the 
1780s Madison held state legislative majorities to constitute a 
greater danger than Congress, he considered his proposal denying 
states the power to "infringe on the equal rights of conscience" to 
be "the most important amendment on the whole list." 111 Later in 
the 1790s, when opposing the national government's censorship of 
the Democratic Societies and enactment of the Alien and Sedition 
Acts of 1798, Madison deemed Congress a more serious threat.II2 
Although wavering on whether the major threat to republican lib-
erty came at the national or state level, Madison remained stead-
fastly convinced that the threat originated with the people, "not 
from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, 
but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of 
the major number of the constituents."II3 
What finally emerged from the First Congress and was ratified 
as the Bill of Rights disappointed Madison, once again. Congress 
rejected his plan for inserting the amendments into the document 
itself; he feared that those declarations of republican liberty might 
be dismissed as less important than the Constitution itself. In addi-
tion, like the Constitutional Convention, Congress rejected his pro-
posal for sharply checking the powers of the states. As historian 
Jack Rakove puts it, "the most Madisonian element of the Constitu-
tion is arguably the fourteenth amendment, which was, of course, 
adopted a full three decades after his death."II4 
Ill. MADISON ON THE SUPREME COURT AND 
PRAGMATIC INTERPRETIVISM 
Madison's appreciation for the Court's role in protecting re-
publican liberty at times fell short of what his theory of republican-
ism could encompass. During the Constitutional Convention, his 
concern with securing a "disinterested and dispassionate umpire in 
disputes between different passions and interests in the State"! IS led 
him to focus on a national veto over the states. Yet, he favored a 
national veto by Congress, not the Court. Madison failed to foresee 
110. Madison, Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 91, at 201-02. 
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the major role that the Court could play in defending national 
supremacy and the rights of individuals and minorities. Besides un-
derestimating the Court's power, he worried that states might re-
fuse to comply with its rulings. Moreover, he looked to preventing 
"injustice" from occurring in the states and Congress. Only after 
the security of republican liberty has been ruptured, after legislation 
is challenged through the adjudicatory process, does the Court 
come into play. In the 1780s, he thus favored alternatives to relying 
on the Court. It was "more convenient to prevent the passage of 
law, than to declare it void after it is passed."116 Also, he noted, 
individuals might not be financially able to appeal to the courts. 
Madison's republicanism, nevertheless, laid a foundation for 
the Court's protection of the rights of individuals and minorities. 
His advocacy of a national veto led directly to the adoption of the 
Supremacy Clause. The original jurisdiction granted in article 
III,m and the appellate jurisdiction given in Section 25 of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, us expressly recognize the Court's role in defend-
ing national supremacy and republican liberty against the states. 
In Federalist 39, Madison alluded to the Court's role as "the 
tribunal which is ultimately to decide controversies relating to the 
boundary between the two jurisdictions" 119 of the national and state 
governments. Later in life, his appreciation grew for that role of the 
Court. Writing to Jefferson in 1823, he recalled that the Constitu-
tional Convention "intended the Authority vested in the Judicial 
Department as a final resort in relation to the States."12o This posi-
tion resonates throughout his correspondence.121 In a letter pub-
lished in the influential North American Review in 1830, for 
example, Madison took pride in his consistency by recalling his ob-
servation in Federalist 39. "Those who had denied or doubted the 
supremacy of the judicial power of the U.S.," he added, "seem not 
to have sufficiently adverted to the utter inefficiency of a supremacy 
in a law of the land, without a supremacy in the exposition & execu-
tion of the law."122 
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Central to understanding the role the Court came to play in 
Madison's theory of republicanism is the distinction he drew be-
tween, on the one hand, the "extreme cases"I23 that arise in a con-
stitutional crisis and, on the other hand, "cases not of that extreme 
character" which frequently arise in the course of constitutional 
government. 
In the "extreme cases," the vast majority of people hold the 
ultimate political power. Nor could it be otherwise, since popular 
sovereignty is the bedrock of republicanism. But, in such cases and 
in keeping with John Locke's teaching on the right to revolution,I24 
Madison cautioned that there could be "no regular Arbiter or Um-
pire" justifying a "resort to the original rights of the parties to the 
system."12s With such appeals to simple majoritarianism, to the 
"extra & ultra constitutional right" of the people, would come the 
dissolution of the Constitution. Consequently, Madison lamented 
popular appeals to the majoritarianism.I26 He insistently urged re-
course to "the final resort, within the purview" of the Constitution, 
namely, amending the Constitution through the prescribed method 
in article V. In the event that the amendment process failed to sat-
isfy, Madison allowed that a final appeal might be made directly to 
the people "from the cancelled obligations of the constitutional 
compact, to original rights & the law of self-preservation."I27 
By contrast, in the routine controversies arising out of the nor-
mal operation of government, Madison considered the Court the 
"surest expositor of the Constitution."12s As he explained in a let-
ter in 1829, "there is & must be an Arbiter or Umpire in the consti-
tutional authority provided for deciding questions concerning the 
boundaries of right & power. The particular provision, in the Con-
stitution of the U.S. is the authority of the Supreme Court, as stated 
in the 'Federalist,' No. 39."129 
In the 1830s, Madison often dwelt on the distinction between 
the Court and the people as the ultimate arbiter of republican lib-
erty and government. He did so for two reasons. First, growing 
sectional conflict between the North and the South revived interest 
in state nullification and his authorship of the Report on the Virginia 
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Resolutions. 13o Second, his support of the national bank, and his 
opposition to Jackson's veto of legislation recharting the bank, also 
brought charges that he was inconsistent in his view of the Consti-
tution. In response to controversies over state nullification and the 
bank, Madison elaborated his views on the Court and developed his 
unique theory of constitutional interpretation. 
Sectional conflict revived interest in the doctrine of state nulli-
fication (that is, that states could nullify federal laws they deemed 
unconstitutional). The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 
and 1799 had been drafted, respectively, by Madison and Jefferson 
in protest of the Alien and Sedition Acts, passed by a Federalist 
dominated Congress and aimed at silencing Jeffersonian Republi-
cans. Along with contending that the acts ran afoul of the first 
amendment, Jefferson went so far as to assert that states could nul-
lify federal laws. The "sovereign and independent" states, asserted 
the Kentucky Resolutions of 1799, "have the unquestionable right to 
judge ... and, that a nullification [by] those sovereignties, of all 
authorized acts done under color of that instrument is the rightful 
remedy." 131 
In his Report on the Virginia Resolutions, however, Madison 
broke with Jefferson. Although masterfully defending civil liberties, 
Madison's report declined to endorse state nullification of federal 
laws.I32 Three decades later, amid renewed controversy over state 
nullification, Madison objected to attempts to stamp his "political 
career with discrediting inconsistencies," such as that he "on some 
occasions, represented the Supreme Court of the United States as 
the judge, in the last resort ... and on other occasions ha[d] as-
signed this last resort to the parties to the Constitution."I33 This 
"extraordinary" charge rested on a distortion, he claimed, rather 
than any inconsistency. "[T]he obvious explanation [was] that the 
last resort means, in one case, the last within the purview and forms 
of the Constitution, and in the other, the last resort of all, from the 
Constitution itself to the parties who made it."134 Indeed, in his 
Report on the Virginia Resolutions, he had emphasized that though 
the Court was the political form of the last resort, "this resort must 
necessarily be deemed the last in relation to the authorities of the 
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other departments of the government; not in the relation to the 
rights of the parties to the constitutional compact, from which the 
judicial, as well as the other departments hold their delegated 
trusts." 135 
Even more than with the Court's assumption of a role in exer-
cising a national veto over state laws, Madison's views matured and 
sharpened with regard to the Court's role in disputes over the sepa-
ration of powers. Prior to the Constitution's ratification, Madison 
argued in the Federalist that "[t]he several departments being per-
fectly co-ordinate by terms of their common commission, neither of 
them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of 
settling the boundaries between their respective powers."I36 While 
not doubting that the Court would "ultimately decide"I37 disputes 
over the constitutional boundaries between the national government 
and the states, the Court's position relative to Congress and the 
President appeared more problematic. In a debate during the First 
Congress, for instance, Madison conceded that "in the ordinary 
course of Government, ... the exposition of the laws and Constitu-
tion devolves upon the Judiciary."IJs Yet, he asked "to know, upon 
what principle it can be contended, that any one department draws 
from the Constitution greater powers than another, in marking out 
the limits of the powers of the several departments."I39 "Nothing," 
he insisted, "has yet been offered to invalidate the doctrine, that the 
meaning of the Constitution may as well be ascertained by the legis-
lative as by the judicial authority."I40 
In the 1830s, the controversy over the national bank renewed 
debate over the authoritativeness of rival interpretations of the Con-
stitution. Madison's contemporaries again questioned his consis-
tency. In December 1790, Hamilton had proposed that Congress 
charter a national bank. The ensuing debate pitted Hamilton and 
the Federalists against Madison and Jefferson over fundamental 
principles of constitutional interpretation and politics. Hamilton 
persuasively argued that Congress had broad constitutional author-
ity to establish such a corporation.I4I The Senate, half of whose 
members had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention, 
unanimously gave its endorsement. But, in the House of Represent-
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atives Madison countered that the creation of the bank went beyond 
the scope of Congress's delegated powers.J42 By a vote of 39 to 20, 
the House nevertheless adopted a bill chartering the bank. In 1791, 
President George Washington signed the act incorporating, and 
granting a twenty year charter to, the first Bank of the United 
States. 
When the bank's charter expired in 1811, one vote defeated its 
renewal in Congress. Notably, as President, Madison supported the 
bank and deemed its constitutionality settled. Four years later, eco-
nomic hardships brought about by the War of 1812, and the na-
tional government's reliance on state banks for loans led Congress 
to establish the second Bank of the United States, with another 
twenty year charter. Opposition in the states remained strong and 
eventually resulted in the Court's watershed ruling in McCulloch v. 
Maryland.J43 There, Chief Justice John Marshall upheld the consti-
tutionality of the bank with a broad reading of congressional powers 
reminiscent of Hamilton's arguments three decades earlier. Still, 
opposition persisted and support for the bank was waning by 1832, 
when Congress passed another bill extending the bank's charter. 
When President Jackson vetoed the legislation recharting the 
second national bank, he denied that McCulloch was binding and 
advanced what has been called the "departmental theory" of judi-
cial review, namely that each branch could authoritatively construe 
its own constitutional powers.J44 In his Veto Message of 1832, 
Jackson claimed that, 
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by 
its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to sup-
port the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as 
it is understood by others. . . . The opinion of the judges has no more authority over 
Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the 
President is independent of both.l45 
Behind Jackson's veto message was a two-pronged theory. First, he 
expressly denied that the Court's interpretation of the Constitution 
had finality, or supremacy over that of the other branches. Second, 
Jackson maintained that in some areas of constitutional politics the 
Court simply had no authority to render decisions, while suggesting 
that in other areas it could do pretty much what it wanted to do. 
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The first prong was (and remains) even more controversial than the 
second.l46 
Jackson's veto message underscores how problematic the 
Court's role remained fifty years after the Constitutional Conven-
tion. In part, it is fair to say, that was due to the Framers' failure to 
think through the power of judicial review. Though they "antici-
pated some sort of judicial review," as political scientist Edward S. 
Corwin observed, "it is equally without question that the ideas gen-
erally current in 1787 were far from presaging the present role of 
the Court."I47 In a letter to Corwin, the noted historian Max Far-
rand agreed and concluded that "[t]he framers of the constitution 
did not realize it themselves [how markedly different their concep-
tions of judicial review were]: they were struggling to express an 
idea and their experience was as yet insufficient."I4s 
Drawn once again into the controversy over the constitutional-
ity of the national bank in the 1830s, Madison responded to charges 
of "inconsistency between [his] objection to the constitutionality of 
such a bank in 1791 and [his] assent in 1817." 149 At stake, he said, 
was "the question of how far legislative precedents, expounding the 
Constitution, ought to guide succeeding Legislatures and overrule 
individual opinions."Iso Simply put, the constitutionality of the na-
tional "bank had undergone ample discussions" Is I in 1791 and 
Madison failed to persuade. On the losing side of the controversy in 
1791, he later favored the bank and felt obligated as President to 
sign the recharting legislation into law. From his perspective, "[o]n 
a simple question of constitutionality there was a decided majority 
in favor of it."1s2 In other words, by 1817 the bank had operated 
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The President is as much bound by the law as any private citizen. . . . He may 
refuse to obey the law, and so may a private citizen; but both do it at their own 
peril, and neither of them can settle the question of its validity. The President may 
say a law is unconstitutional, but he is not the judge. . . . If it were otherwise, there 
would be no government of laws; but we should all live under the government, the 
rule, the caprices of individuals ... . 
[President Jackson's] message ... converts a constitutional limitation of power 
into mere matters of opinion, and then strikes the judicial department, as an effi-
cient department, out of our system .... 
[The message] denies first principles. It contradicts truths heretofore received 
as indisputable. It denies to the judiciary the interpretation of law. 
D. WEBSTER, 8 CONG. DEBATES 1232, 1239-40 (1832). 
147. E. Corwin, The Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol, 30 A.P.S.R. 1078 (1936). 
148. Letter from Farrand to Edward Corwin (January 3, 1939), in Edward Samuel 
Corwin Papers, Box 3, Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey. 
149. Letter from James Madison to Mr. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in 4 LET-
TERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (1884). 
150. /d. at 183-84. 
151. /d. at 184. 
152. /d. at 185. 
144 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:119 
for over "twenty years with annual legislative recognitions ... and 
with the entire acquiescence of all the local authorities, as well as of 
the nation at large."ts3 "[U]nder these circumstances," Madison 
claimed a veto of the bank bill would have been, as Jackson's veto, 
in "defiance of all the obligations derived from a course of prece-
dents amounting to the requisite evidence of the national judgment 
and intention."ts4 
Madison's reconciliation of his positions on the constitutional-
ity of the national bank reveals his underlying theory of pragmatic 
constitutional interpretivism. As other scholars have shown, m 
Madison had no truck with a "jurisprudence of original intentions," 
as championed by Justice Scalia, Bork, and others. The Constitu-
tion, he repeatedly reminded his contemporaries, "was not, like the 
fabled Goddess of Wisdom, the offspring of a single brain."ts6 
Madison was keenly attune to interpretative problems intertwining 
the politics of interpretation and the interpretation of politics.m 
He frequently noted, for example, the temptation to put 
"glosses"tss on the text and the historical proceedings of the Consti-
tutional Convention,' s9 as well as the limited reliability of such doc-
uments as The Federalist.'~ "As a guide in expounding and 
applying the provisions of the Constitution," he stressed, "the de-
bates and incidental decisions of the Convention can have no au-
thoritative character."t6t For those reasons, Madison also withheld 
the publication of his notes on the Constitutional Convention for a 
half-century, until after his death. Their publication, he explained, 
was "delayed til the Constitution should be well settled by practice, 
and till a knowledge of the controversial part of the proceedings of 
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its framers could be turned to no improper account."I62 
Madison took the pragmatic view that constitutional interpre-
tation involves "practical judgment," not "solitary opinions as to 
the meaning of the law or the Constitution, in opposition to a con-
struction reduced to practice during a reasonable period of time." I63 
Just as he rejected appeals to "original intentions," he held that a 
"strict" or "literal" interpretation might be "a hard imputation on 
the Framers and Ratifiers of the Constitution," as well as a "hard 
rule of construction," potentially injurious to "the text of the Con-
stitution" itself.I64 "[A]mong the obvious and just guides applica-
ble to [interpreting] the Const[itutio]n," Madison listed:I6s 
I. The evils & defects for curing which the Constitution was called for & 
introduced. 
2. The comments prevailing at the time it was adopted. 
3. The early, deliberate and continued practice under the Constitution, as 
preferable to constructions adapted on the spur of occasions, and subject to the 
vicissitudes of party or personal ascendencies. 
Beyond those practical guides, Madison counseled that "the true 
and safe construction" of the Constitution would emerge in the 
"course of practice" upon receiving "uniform sanction" over "a pe-
riod of years and under the varied ascendency of parties."I66 
Madison accorded precedents great weight and considered 
them binding on the President and Congress, no less than on the 
Court. Were it otherwise, as Jackson claimed in his veto message, 
"uncertainty and instability [would be introduced] in[to] the Con-
stitution."I67 When arguing that Presidents and legislators were 
constitutionally obligated to adhere to well-established precedents 
and practices, Madison drew on an analogy to the "binding influ-
ence" of the judicial doctrine of stare decisis.J68 In his view, a judge 
should conform to precedents established "by the matured opinions 
of the majority of his colleagues" and not "vary the rule of law 
according to his individual interpretation of it."I69 If not, then 
every newly reconstituted Court or "every new legislative opinion 
162. /d. 
163. Madison, supra note 149, at 185. 
164. Madison, Memorandum on Power of the President to appoint Public Ministers & 
Consuls in the recess of the Senate, reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 91, 92-
93 (1910). 
165. Letter from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), reprinted in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 370, 372 (1910). 
166. Madison, supra note 149, at 186. 
167. /d. at 185. 
168. /d. at 184-85. 
169. /d. See also, Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell, supra note !57, at 
642-43. 
146 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:119 
might make a new Constitution, as the foot of every new chancellor 
would make a new standard of measure."11o Judicial precedents 
and established legislative practices had "authoritative force in set-
tling the meaning of a law" not only because of Madison's theory of 
pragmatic interpretativism. He also advanced the utilitarian con-
sideration that "the good of society" required certainty, stability 
and predictability in the law.171 
Two years before his death in 1836 Madison concentrated spe-
cifically on the Court's role in constitutional politics. He reaffirmed 
that since the Congress, the President, and the Court "are co-ordi-
nate, and each equally bound to support the Constitution, it follows 
that each must ... be guided by the text of the Constitution accord-
ing to its own interpretations of it."m However, "notwithstanding 
this abstract view," Madison now emphasized that the Court "most 
familiarizes itself to the public attention as the expositor, by the 
order of its functions in relation to the other departments." He 
never abandoned his view that Congress and the President might 
construe the Constitution. But in light of a half-century's experi-
ence with the Constitution and the Court, he fully appreciated that 
in actual practice the Court decides cases and controversies after 
and in light of the interpretations advanced by Congress and the 
President. The "ultimate discussion and operative decision,"I73 
therefore, comes from the Court because it stands as the final forum 
for appeals within government itself, short of either amending the 
Constitution or, worse yet, appealing directly to the people, "that 
Ultimate Arbiter."I74 Madison concluded that the Court was the 
"last resort" and "surest expositor" of the Constitution in contro-
versies over both federalism and the separation of powers within the 
national government. "[W]hen happily filled," as he put it, the 
Court was "the surest expositor of the Constitution" in controver-
sies "concerning the boundaries between the several departments of 
Government as in those between the Union and its members."I75 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Madison's reconstruction of republicanism was unique and dis-
tinctively American. While popular sovereignty remained the bed-
rock of republicanism, Madison elevated republican liberty above 
republican government. Because of his concern with the darker 
side of republicanism (majoritarianism) he worked fundamental 
changes in the theory and practice of republican government. 
Madison's "naturalist" argument was instrumental in making 
republicanism more acceptable by emphasizing the liberalism that 
accompanies the cultural pluralism of large and populous territo-
ries. He turned to this new grounding for republican government 
only in part out of rejecting of Montesquieu's teaching about small 
republics. Madison also discounted the weight that Montes-
quieu,176 some Anti-federalists,111 and later Alexis de Toc-
queville, 11s attributed to civic virtue and religion. Such appeals ran 
against his secularism and abiding faith in reason. Far from being 
reliable safeguards, they posed serious threats to the security of re-
publican liberty. Indeed, throughout Madison's career a major con-
cern remained securing religious freedom for individuals and 
minorities against the oppressive forces of popular and legislative 
majorities. 179 
Building on his argument for republicanism in large and popu-
lous territories, Madison repeatedly sought to buttress representa-
tive government with auxiliary precautions for republican liberty. 
Although he had preferred additional institutional checks against 
legislative majorities in Congress and the states, the Constitution 
even as written did not embrace simple majoritarianism, or legisla-
tive majoritarianism. For "the father of the Constitution," there 
was no mystery in the making of free government: "mysteries be-
long to religion, not to government; to the ways of the Almighty, 
not to the works of man. And in religion itself there is nothing 
mysterious to its author; the mystery lies in the dimness of the 
human sight. So in the institutions of government let there be no 
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mystery."tso 
Madison refined the insights originally contained in Vices and 
elaborated his theory of republicanism in response to the practical 
problems of securing republican liberty. While publicly defending 
and privately confessing disappointment with the Constitution, 
Madison was moved to accept the "parchment barriers" of the Bill 
of Rights and the Court's role in protecting republican liberty. He 
reluctantly became "the father of the Bill of Rights." His theory of 
republicanism accommodated the Bill of Rights and laid a founda-
tion for its defense as a protection of the rights of individuals and 
minorities. 
Madison came to accept a more expansive role for the Court in 
the 1830s than he anticipated in the 1780s. Admittedly, he did not 
foresee the full development or potential of the Court. Nor, of 
course, did he entertain the idea that the Court would be the sole, or 
even primary, guardian of republican liberty. At times, he also bris-
tled at the Court's intrusion into the domains of Congress and the 
President. But Madison also harbored both a distrust of majoritari-
anism in the normal operation of government and a devotion to re-
publican liberty. His unique theories of republicanism and 
pragmatic interpretativism offer no support for the originalist phi-
losophy advanced by Justice Scalia, Bork, and others. Madison 
never entertained the idea of returning to the English system of par-
liamentary democracy, in which legislative majorities dominate. 
The Constitution, as he repeatedly emphasized, stood "without a 
model, as emphatically sui generis."tst 
In Madison's view, constitutional controversies found their res-
olutions in deliberations and adjudications that establish the bind-
ing precedents and practices of constitutional government. Because 
of his pragmatic theory of constitutional interpretation, Madison 
was convinced that those precedents and practices bound the Presi-
dent, Congress, and the Court, though remaining subject to reversal 
by formal constitutional amendments. In the end, Madison consid-
ered the Court was the "last resort" and "surest expositor of the 
Constitution" within constitutional government, while still main-
taining that the ultimate security for (and ultimate threat to) repub-
lican liberty remained with the people. 
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